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This paper uses data on individual earnings in manufacturing industry for five African
countries in the early 1990s to test whether firms located in the capital city pay higher
wages than firms located elsewhere, and whether such benefits accrue to all or only certain
types of workers. Earnings equations are estimated that take into account worker
characteristics (education and tenure) and relevant firm characteristics (notably size and
whether foreign owned). Any location effect identified is therefore additional to
appropriate control variables. There are two main findings. First, we find evidence of a
‘pure capital city premium’ equivalent to between 12 per cent and 28 per cent of nominal
average earnings in the five countries. In some countries this location premium exceeds
plausible consumer price differentials, between the capital and other urban areas. This does
suggest that real (purchasing power) manufacturing wages are higher in the capital city
(although this real premium is no more than ten per cent). Second, we find that skilled
workers earn a higher wage premium in the capital city than those less skilled. However,.../…
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this is not because of location effects on earnings per se, but rather because of other firm
characteristics of firms located in the capital city, such as size and foreign ownership. This
suggests that spatial inequality in itself does not directly contribute to skilled–less-skilled
wage differentials.
Acknowledgements
This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the WIDER-Cornell-LSE Conference on
Spatial Inequality, held at the London School of Economics, 27-29 June 2002. We are
grateful to DFID for funding under grant R8003, to CSAE for making available the data
used, and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Views and opinions expressed
are those of the authors alone.1
1 Introduction
Within the broad context of spatial inequality, this paper examines the issue of inequality
in manufacturing wages. Specifically, we ask if workers with similar characteristics are
paid higher wages (in purchasing power terms) if employed by firms located in the capital
city than if employed by firms located elsewhere. Available evidence suggests that poverty
is higher, and average incomes lower, in some regions of a country than in others, and
typically incomes are highest in and around the capital city (or the major city if it is not the
administrative capital) for the countries we consider. To a large extent, spatial inequalities
reflect rural–urban divides in earning opportunities associated with the sector composition
of employment—higher paid jobs in manufacturing and services are concentrated in urban
areas, whereas low paid agriculture sector jobs are in rural areas. However, it may be the
case that even within the manufacturing sector there are spatial inequalities in wages, and
this is the issue we investigate.
The availability of large-scale surveys has supported a noticeable increase in research on
manufacturing enterprises in Africa. Much of this was initiated with the World Bank and
the bilateral donor-sponsored Regional Programme on Enterprise Development (RPED),
which funded surveys in a number of African countries during the 1990s. We use data
from the first three waves of surveys (1990-93) for five countries: Cameroon, Ghana,
Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A particular advantage of the RPED data is that there are
two datasets, one at the firm level with information on firm characteristics, and the other
containing data on individuals (earnings and employee characteristics). Our primary
concern is with the information on individual employees, and the firm-level data is used to
identify the characteristics of the firms in which they are employed (in particular whether
there is foreign ownership). We examine if firms located in the capital city pay higher
earnings for equivalent workers when compared with firms located elsewhere, controlling
for relevant firm characteristics.
A number of recent studies analyse these surveys (e.g. Bigsten et al. 1997, 1999, 2000;
Strobl and Thornton 2002; Söderbom and Teal 2001a,b), but most are primarily concerned
with firm-level data and none specifically address the questions raised in this paper.
Bigsten et al. (2000) examine rates of return on physical and human capital whereas Strobl
and Thornton (2002) and Mazumdar (1995), using the same cross-country dataset that we
use, are more concerned with the effect of firm size. te Velde and Morrissey (2001) use the
same data to study the effect of foreign ownership on earnings. This paper follows the
same general approach and includes control variables identified as important in the
previous studies, but with a focus on the effect of location on earnings and earnings
differentials.
We do not present measures of spatial inequality, but rather present some evidence on
location differences in manufacturing earnings. Although we do not know where firms not
located in the capital city were actually based, the presumption is that most of the firms
were located in other urban areas rather than in rural areas. Unfortunately, most of the
information on spatial differences in inequality and poverty refers to rural–urban and/or2
regional differences. We review some evidence on Ghana and Zambia to give an indication
of the magnitudes. As we in effect identify the wage premium of being employed in the
capital city, to evaluate the significance of this we would like data on price or cost of living
differences between the capital city and other urban areas. Such data were unavailable,
requiring us to make a judgement on the likely magnitude of price differentials.
McCulloch  et al. (2000) show that there were significant rural–urban and regional
differences in poverty and inequality in Zambia in 1991. Mean per adult equivalent real
consumption in urban areas was some three times the level of that in rural areas. They
estimate, again for 1991, that some 70 per cent of the national population were below the
upper poverty line; this figure was almost 90 per cent in rural areas but 47 per cent in urban
areas (although there was a dramatic increase in urban poverty during the 1990s). Rural
inequality was at the national level with a Gini of 0.56, compared to 0.45 in urban areas.
The three most urbanized provinces (Copperbelt, Central and Lusaka) had Ginis ranging
from 0.47 to 0.52, whereas in rural provinces Ginis were mostly about 0.6. The general
perception that poverty and inequality are higher in rural areas is confirmed for Zambia.
However, as poverty and inequality are similar in the urbanized provinces, there is no
reason to assume large price differentials between the capital city and other urban areas
(where firms are likely to be located).
Coulombe and McKay (2001) compare poverty and inequality in Ghana between 1991-92
and 1998-99. Overall inequality increased, especially in rural areas, while inequality in
Accra fell. Thus, urban-rural inequality rose. Almost 20 per cent of overall inequality was
due to inequality between locations. They note that inequality fell for formal sector
employees. Of greater relevance for our purposes, they report data on cost of living indices
that suggest that the cost of living in Accra is about 12 per cent higher than in other urban
areas. The corresponding differential may be even higher in Kenya. The average monthly
basic minimum wage in Nairobi was 1706 Kenyan Shillings in 1992, whereas that in other
(small, rural) towns was 1343, some 20 per cent lower (Republic of Kenya, 1995) which
does not give comparable price data).
We would expect to find that wages are higher in the capital city, if only because the cost
of living is higher than in other urban areas. While there is no evidence that such a
differential exists in Zambia, the differential is in the range 10-20 per cent for Ghana and
Kenya. Our aim is to see if the capital city premium is at least what would be explained by
price differences, and to elicit some of the other factors that may explain higher capital city
wages. We present estimates of a ‘raw’ and a ‘pure’ premium. The raw premium is the
difference in the wage paid to similar workers, in terms of educational qualification or skill
level. The pure premium adjusts this to control for the possibility that the types of firms
that pay higher wages, such as larger or foreign-owned firms, are more likely to locate in
the capital city.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some issues in the literature
relating to wage inequality, identifying reasons why wages may be higher in the capital.
This is brief as the literature has not specifically addressed the issue of spatial inequality.
Section 3 then presents the wage determination model, essentially a Mincerian framework.3
Section 4 discusses the data and presents our results, assessing whether the location
premium benefits specific types of workers. Conclusions are presented in Section 5 with a
discussion of the significance of the location premium estimated.
2 Factors influencing spatial inequality in manufacturing wages
There are at least three general reasons why workers employed by firms located in the
capital city may earn higher wages than workers employed by firms located elsewhere.
First, the distribution of worker  characteristics may be skewed towards a particular
location. While we can control for observed characteristics, such as educational attainment
(level of schooling reached) or experience (measured as tenure), and therefore compare
‘similar workers’ (i.e. those with similar characteristics), there may be important
unobserved factors. For example, workers in the capital city may be more motivated or
better educated (e.g. urban schools may give better quality teaching, or the workers may
have had higher exam marks) and are therefore paid more. Such unobserved characteristics
will be part of any observed differences in earnings for apparently similar workers.
Second, the distribution of firm characteristics may be skewed towards a particular location
and such features of firms can be associated with higher wages. Much of the literature on
wage inequality is concerned with the effects of size and foreign ownership, especially
foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinationals. Two issues arise. Do foreign or larger
firms pay higher wages than local firms to similar workers? And do foreign or larger firms
contribute to increasing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers? We will
consider some of these issues indirectly, insofar as we account for size and ownership in
the wage equations.
The literature on multinationals suggests that the presence of a firm-specific asset explains
in part the observation of a wage differential between foreign-owned and local firms
(Dunning 1993). Affiliates of multinationals use more up-to-date technologies, require
more skilled workers, have access to better inputs, are more productive, face lower capital
costs and, hence, can pay more. But there are also other reasons for a wage differential (see
te Velde and Morrissey 2001). Foreign firms may be more profitable than local firms and,
as Blanchflower et al. (1996) argue, earnings can be positively correlated to profits, which
is shown empirically in the case of Ghana (Söderbom and Teal 2001a). The firm
characteristics that are known to be associated with higher earnings may be correlated with
location in the capital city. In particular, workers in larger firms (measured by
employment) have higher earnings—the ‘size premium’ identified by te Velde and
Morrissey (2001) and Strobl and Thornton (2002), amongst others. Similarly, te Velde and
Morrissey (2001) identify a ‘foreign premium’ as foreign-owned firms pay higher wages to
equivalent workers. We will test for the possibility that firms with such characteristics,
larger and/or foreign-owned, are more likely to locate in capital cities. This accounts for
differences in the raw and pure premium in earnings for those employed in capital cities.
Third, workers in capital cities may earn higher wages than similar workers employed by
similar firms located outside the capital city. This could simply be to compensate for a
higher cost of living. Higher wages in the presence of a higher cost of living will help to4
maintain the balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces (see Krugman and Livas
1996; and Fujita et al. 1999). If wages are too high compared to consumer prices, firms
may locate elsewhere. Similarly, if wages are too low compared to consumer prices,
workers may choose to work elsewhere. Consumer prices may be higher in the capital city
than elsewhere, therefore earnings have to be higher to maintain purchasing power. While
we use a measure of real earnings, this is constructed from an aggregate country deflator
and therefore does not capture regional price variations. We do not have information on
regional price variability that is compatible with our wage data, and cannot account for this
directly. We will consider if any estimated location premium (higher earnings in the capital
city) is consistent with plausible magnitudes of regional price variations. Significant long-
run variations in real earnings across space is only possible when labour markets are
sufficiently segmented spatially, otherwise worker migration and/or firm location would
erode the differential.
However, keeping a balance between centrifugal and centriputal forces does not explain
the existence of a spatial wage differential in the first place. There are two different
explanations for such wage differential and to distinguish between these explanations
would require information on the effects of location on earnings as well as productivity.1
One possible reason is that unionization, or bargaining power more generally, is greater in
the capital city. In other words, there are location reasons why wages (not productivity) in
the capital city may be higher for similar workers. This may apply to a larger extent to
skilled workers who would otherwise be poached by other firms. Firms would not be able
to afford paying higher wages over the long run unless compensated for this in the form of
lower costs for other inputs or in the form of higher production efficiency.
Another possible reason for higher wages in capital cities for otherwise similar workers is
that capital cities may enhance the productivity of firms and workers within firms. Hence,
firms in capital cities can afford to pay more to their workers than firms located elsewhere,
in the short as well as the long run. Urban economies may lead to greater production
efficiency as they exhibit increasing returns to scale associated with three types of
agglomeration economies (Wheaton and Lewis 2002). Urbanization economies could arise
if larger cities provide more direct support services and industrial linkages. Localization
economies may arise from knowledge transferred between firms in the same industry,
through direct contact or spatial proximity, and could enhance skill accumulation and
productivity. There may also be localization scale economies if agglomeration improves
labour market search and matching, which in turn enhances specialization and
productivity.2 Agglomeration economies may lead to static or dynamic improvements in
productivity, which can then lead to higher wages. It could be that skilled workers are able
to capture more of such productivity gains through their ability to learn more from contacts
than less-skilled workers, in which case skilled workers could benefit more from being
employed by firms in the capital city.
                                                
1 This study concentrates on the effects of location on earnings and, hence, may not be able to distinguish
between both explanations appropriately.
2 Glaeser and Mare (1994) distinguish between two types of (dynamic) location economies. They find that
faster urban wage growth can be explained by faster skill accumulation not by improved labour market
outcomes in cities.5
3 Location and the earnings function
We use and extend the framework of Mincer (1974) to examine the effects of location on
earnings of individuals. This basic framework has been applied by Bigsten et al. (2000)
and te Velde and Morrissey (2001) to the database we use. The starting point is to estimate
the following equation:
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Yit is a measure of the wage of individual i=1,…,N at time t=1,…,T. Sij is a binary dummy
which is 1 for the highest level j of education completed (or number of years of schooling
in the original Mincerian framework)—we include all levels of education except the first
(no education), hence j=1,…,J-1, and rj is the rate of return to the completion of education
level j. Experience is captured by employee’s age and ten, the number of years employed
by the current firm (tenure), and the squared terms allow for non-linear effects. The
substance of this paper is to include location in (1) in a number of ways to assess the effect
on earnings.
The first extension is to include a binary dummy LOCCi =1 if the firm in which individual
i is employed in the capital city, and zero otherwise:
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The coefficient ϕ  is the percentage increase in earnings enjoyed by individual i because
s/he is employed in a firm located in the capital—what we term the raw premium. The
coefficient ϕ  may overstate the true effects if location is correlated with control variables
(Zk, the firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, sector, etc.) that are positively
correlated with the dependent variable. For example, it may be the case that larger firms
locate in the capital city and it is established that there is a size premium in earnings. Thus,
the coefficient on LOCC may be in part or wholly due to the fact that large firms locate in
the capital city. A similar argument applies in the case of foreign-owned firms. Equation
(3) therefore includes firm-level control variables (k=1,…,K).
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We then estimate (4) to assess whether the raw premium (= ϕ k in (3)) occurs for workers in
all sectors (control variables ZSEC,l equal 1 for sector l=1,…,L and 0 otherwise), or workers
in some sectors only:6
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Regression equation (5) estimates (3), but interacts the variable LOCC with education level
S (here for j=1,…,J) to assess whether location is beneficial for individuals regardless of
the level of education completed.
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Finally, (6) repeats (5) but replaces levels of education with types of occupation
(SKILLOCCUP = skilled occupations such as managers, supervisors, sales workers and
administrators, while other occupations are defined as less-skilled) to assess whether
foreign ownership affects individuals equally regardless of the type of occupation. Given
possible explanations discussed earlier, ϕ j in (6) could be higher with more complex and
skilled occupations if skilled workers in capital cities are better at skill accumulation or
better at wage bargaining than less-skilled workers in capital cities.
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When using the interaction terms between location and occupation/education we assume
that observable worker and firm characteristics are the only determinants of worker
earnings. If this is not so, for instance if unobservable worker or firm characteristics affect
earnings, the ϕ j coefficients will be biased if location is correlated with the unobservables.
One could allow for firm-specific effects by first differencing and availing of the panel
nature of the firm-level data (e.g. Söderbom and Teal 2001a). However, it is not possible to
allow for worker-specific effects as we have data on a repeated cross-section basis and not
a panel for individual employees. The same firms are interviewed over time, but the
workers interviewed within these firms are not necessarily the same.3
4 Data description and results
The data in this paper draw from firm-level surveys in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia
and Zimbabwe as part of the Regional Programme on Enterprise Development (RPED)
conducted in repeated waves during the 1990s. In the dataset we use (that available on the
CSAE website) there are three years (waves) of data for most of the five countries,
                                                
3 Strobl and Thornton (2002) note that as some workers are interviewed more than once, there is a potential
for correlated errors if multiple observations for the same worker are included. They try to test for this with
the Ghanaian data and find no evidence for a bias in results.7
covering firms in four manufacturing sectors: food, timber, textiles and metal. The dataset
includes formal and informal firms of various sizes, and is thought to be representative of
the manufacturing sector in the respective countries.
We link two datasets, one containing data on firm characteristics (RPED), such as location,
sector, ownership structure, and another containing data on individuals (EARN), such as
education, occupation, tenure, age and earnings. The two databases can be linked through a
country-specific firm identifier in addition to data on waves. The data relate to two or three
different years, and as there are insufficient time series, we pooled data across waves and
focus on a static framework. Our core variable of interest is firms located in the capital city
(LOCC = 1, otherwise 0). Other control variables are included. For example, the variable
FOR is a 0/1 dummy to define if a firm is foreign-owned.
We use monthly earnings data (wages and benefits) in current domestic prices as the
‘wage’ variable, the measure commonly applied in studies using this data. The dependent
variable in the regression analysis is in logs. An important part of the analysis in this paper
relates to the education and occupation variables. The data distinguish between five
different levels of education: no education, some primary education, primary education
completed, secondary education completed and university. The data also distinguish
occupation categories, which we allocate as skilled or unskilled (see te Velde and
Morrissey 2001).
Appendix Table 1 compares the mean of the log of earnings of workers in the capital city
and elsewhere. It shows that average wages are higher in the capital city for all countries.
As hypothesised previously, part of the explanation is in the distribution of worker
characteristics across space: in all five countries the average number of years of formal
schooling is higher for workers in the capital city than for workers elsewhere.
The distribution of firm characteristics across space is also likely to contribute to higher
earnings in the capital city (the raw premium). Summary data on the sample classified
according to location, ownership and firm size is provided in the Appendix Table 2. This
relates to a total of 2824 firms (the regressions are based on employees linked to firms,
hence the sample is much larger), 58 per cent are located in the capital city and 42 per cent
are not. The sample is fairly evenly spread over the countries, largely reflecting their
relative sizes: 25 per cent of firms are from Cameroon; 23 per cent from Kenya; 20 per
cent from Zimbabwe; 18 per cent from Ghana; and 14 per cent from Zambia. Zambia is the
only country for which fewer firms are located in the capital city (probably reflecting the
importance of the copperbelt provinces), while the proportions are fairly even in Ghana.
Considering all countries together, about 20 per cent of firms are owned by foreigners and
such firms are more likely to be located in the capital city than are local firms (for all
countries except Zambia).
There is a general tendency for larger firms to be located in the capital city, especially
foreign-owned firms. This is not true for the largest size category (firms with more than
500 employees) overall, but is true if we define larger firms as those with more than 50
employees. Only in Zimbabwe are the largest firms more likely to be in the capital city; in8
Cameroon they are clearly less likely to be in the capital city, while for the other countries
the number of firms in this category is very small. In all countries the smallest firms (10 or
fewer employees) are almost all locally owned. In Cameroon and Kenya they are more
likely to be in the capital city, in Ghana and Zimbabwe they are less likely, while numbers
are evenly split in Zambia.


























Notes: Cameroon is the omitted country, Food the omitted sector. White heteroscedasticity-consistent
t-statistics in parenthesis; * indicates significance at least at the 5% level. Dependent variable = 1 if LOCC, 0
otherwise.
Source: Authors’ computations.
Table 1 presents the results of a simple logit estimation to see which characteristics are
significantly correlated with location in the pooled sample (i.e. pooling all five countries).
Allowing for country and sector effects, we find that in our sample larger firms tend to
locate in the capital city but there is no significant tendency for foreign-owned firms to
locate in the capital. As compared to Cameroon, firms are less likely to be located in the
capital in Zambia and Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, Ghana. Firms in the metal sector
appear most likely to locate in the capital.9
Table 2 summarises the results of estimating equations (1) to (6) for manufacturing in five
African countries.4 The first row of Table 2 presents estimates of (2), the raw premium.
The effects of location are positive, substantial and significant in all regressions. Earnings
for individuals in firms located in the capital city are 34 per cent higher in Kenya, 32 per
cent in Ghana, 19 per cent higher in Cameroon, 16 per cent in Zimbabwe and 13 per cent
Zambia. The second row of Table 2 presents estimates of specification (3), confirming that
the effects of LOCC on earnings are reduced when taking firm-specific control variables
into account. Nevertheless, the pure location premium remains quite large at 12 per cent in
Zimbabwe, 15 per cent in Cameroon and Zambia, 26 per cent in Ghana and 28 per cent in
Kenya. The location premium applies to all workers in Ghana and Kenya, but to skilled
workers only in the other countries. There are no consistent patterns by sector of firm or
education of workers.
Table 2: Summary of main results from wage equations
Cameroon Ghana Kenya Zambia Zimbabwe
LOCC premium
No controls 0.19 0.32 0.34 0.13 0.16



















Notes: Summary of results from Tables 2-6; ns implies non-significant differences in coefficients (based on
P-values). ‘LOCC premium’ is coefficient on LOCC in specifications (2), no controls, and (3), with firm specific
controls. Sectors are the significant interactive (LOCC*sector) terms in specification (4). Education are the
significant interactive (LOCC*education) terms in specification (5). Occupation gives the significant interactive
(LOCC*occupation) categories in specification (6): skilled or less-skilled occupations.
Source: Authors’ computations.
4.1 What type of worker benefits from spatial inequality?
To assess if the earnings ‘premium’ from location applies equally to different types of
worker, we first estimate (4). The results, in row 4 of Table 2, suggest that the earnings
premium does differ by sector for Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe. The P-values (for F-tests)
are smaller than 5 per cent, implying that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients (on
sector*LOCC) can be rejected for these three countries. There are significant sector effects
                                                
4 We began by estimating (1) for each country to check whether our results are consistent with those reported
in Table 4 of the working paper version of Bigsten et al. (2000). The results were the same except for minor
differences, such as values of t-statistics, which may be due to the use of a different statistical package. Most
coefficients are well determined and consistent with expectations. Details are available on request—we report
here only the main results.10
in Ghana (wood and food sectors), Kenya (all sectors) and Zimbabwe (metal and food),
and hence workers in some sectors benefit more than workers in other sectors when they
are located in the capital city.5
Table 3: Earnings equations with education attainment, specification (5)



























































































Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1534 2257 3035 1593 1866
R-squared 0.52 0.51 0.39 0.48 0.39
Test P=0.24 P=0.14 P=0.01 P=0.08 P=0.20
Notes: Dependent variable is log of monthly earnings in current domestic currency. White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parenthesis; *indicates significance at least at the 5 per cent level.
Equation as specified in the text. Standard worker controls (age, tenure, male, state ownership foreign
ownership etc.) included in the regressions but not reported here (available upon request).
Source: Authors’ computations.
We then estimate specification (5) and present the results in the Table 3. There are some
patterns, but they are not very clear. The first three rows confirm that wages increase with
education (as compared to no education); this is least for Ghana and most pronounced for
Zambia. The size and foreign ownership premiums are also evident. A capital city
premium applies for those with primary or secondary education in all countries, is
considerable for those with no education in Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but does not
accrue to those with university education (except in Cameroon). In Zambia the location
premium decreases with education whereas in Cameroon it increases (the other countries
are more variable).
                                                
5 This compares well with evidence in Hanson (1997, table 3) for Mexico. Wage differentials between
Mexico City and other regions vary substantially by sector.11
Table 4 presents results of estimating (6) using interaction terms between LOCC  and
occupation (skilled and less-skilled) rather than LOCC and education. The interpretation
appears much clearer. For all countries, there is a clear difference in capital city premia
between skilled and less-skilled occupations (indeed the premium for less skilled is
negative in Zimbabwe). There are a number of general results:
•   Workers in skilled occupations earn a premium (of 30-60 per cent) when they are
employed by firms located in the capital city.
•   Workers in less skilled occupations earn a significant capital premium (of some 20 per
cent) in Ghana and Kenya.
•   Less-skilled workers do not earn a significant capital city premium in Cameroon and
Zambia, while their premium is negative in Zimbabwe.
Table 4: Earnings equations with occupations, specification (6)









































































Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 1534 2257 3035 1593 1866




P=0.00 P=0.00 P=0.00 P=0.00 P=0.00
Notes: Dependent variable is log of monthly earnings in current domestic currency. White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parenthesis; * indicates significance at least at the 5 per cent level.
Equation as specified in the text. Standard worker controls (age, tenure, male, state ownership foreign
ownership etc.) included in the regressions but not reported here (available upon request).
Source: Authors’ computations.
We now consider if the location wage premium varies by skill level after taking into
account that LOCC tend to be larger firms, and the employer size premium varies by skill
level (Strobl and Thornton 2002), and that the foreign ownership premium also varies by12
skill level (te Velde and Morrissey 2001). Are senior and more skilled workers paid more
in firms located in the capital city simply because such firms tend to be larger or foreign-
owned, or does a capital city wage premium remain after accounting for these factors? The
results are in Table 5. Tests indicate that we cannot reject, for all countries, the hypothesis
that the coefficients on LOCC*SK and LOCC*UNSK are equal. Thus, in general, the
location premium applies equally to all workers in each country—spatial inequality is not
associated with skilled–unskilled wage differentials.6 However, the size premium is
significantly greater for skilled workers in all countries, as can be seen from the log(emp)
interaction terms. This suggests that  skilled workers were  able to obtain a higher earnings
premium in the capital city, compared to less-skilled workers, mainly because larger firms
tend to locate in the capital city and such firms pay a premium to skilled workers. The
foreign premium also favours skilled workers in Cameroon, Kenya and Zambia, and this
may contribute to a higher skill premium for workers located in the capital. In Ghana, the
foreign premium favours unskilled workers.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper uses data on individual earnings in the manufacturing industry of five African
countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in the early 1990s to test
whether location is associated with higher earnings for all education and occupation
groups. Similar workers employed by firms located in the capital city do earn higher
wages; the raw premium is in the range 13-32 per cent. Controlling for firm characteristics,
the pure capital city premium is significant: 12-15 per cent in Cameroon, Zambia and
Zimbabwe; 26-28 per cent in Ghana and Kenya. This location premium seems to apply to
all types of workers, whether classified by education or skill level. While we found that
skilled workers earn a higher wage premium in the capital city than less-skilled workers,
this was not because of location effects per se, but rather because of firm characteristics
associated with firms located in the capital city such as size and foreign ownership. This
suggests that spatial inequality in itself does not directly contribute to skilled/less-skilled
wage differentials.
We find some evidence for all three sources of spatial wage inequality identified in
Section 2. First, the distribution of worker characteristics is skewed towards the capital
city, for example the number of years of formal education is higher for workers in the
capital city. Note, however, that observed worker characteristics are accounted for and do
not contribute to the premium. Secondly, firm characteristics are also important: larger
and/or foreign-owned firms tend to pay a significant wage premium, generally favouring
more skilled workers, and are more likely to locate in the capital city. The tendency of the
types of firms that pay higher wages to locate in the capital accounts for about five
percentage points of the raw premium in all countries except Zambia. Finally, workers in
capital cities earn higher wages than similar workers employed by similar firms located
outside the capital city, the pure premium estimated.
                                                
6 This compares well with similar evidence for Thailand (Matsuoka 2001). Controlling for other factors such
as size and industry dummies, firms located in Bangkok and vicinity pay 39 per cent more to non-production
workers and 36 per cent more to production workers than similar workers elsewhere.13
Table 5: Who benefits from location in the capital?



































































































































































Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 1534 2257 1937 1593 1866












P=0.003 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000
Notes: As for Table 3. Dependent variable is log of monthly earnings in current domestic currency.
Source: Authors’ computations.14
We do not have adequate data on spatial price variations to assess if the pure location
premium corresponds to a premium on real earnings (purchasing power) differentials. In
the case of Ghana and Kenya, where prices in the capital appear to have been 10-20 per
cent higher than in other urban areas, the pure location premium could account for no more
than a ten per cent increase in real purchasing power. In Zambia, where evidence suggests
little spatial variation in urban prices, the real premium also is no more than ten per cent. In
general, we do not find strong evidence that the earnings premium from being employed in
the capital city contributes to spatial inequality to any appreciable degree. A potential real
premium of ten per cent could be accounted for by unobserved worker (and firm)
characteristics and statistical confidence intervals. Migration and ‘new economic
geography’ (agglomeration) theories would predict that, in equilibrium, real earnings are
equalized across locations. In this sense our findings support such theories.
We can, however, be confident that a pure location premium exists, probably even in real
purchasing power terms. The data available do not allow us to distinguish between the
various explanations for a pure (real) location premium: unobserved characteristics,
agglomeration economies (increasing productivity) or greater bargaining power of workers
in cities. The new economic geography (NEG) approach of Fujita et al. (1999) cannot be
directly tested, but we can make two observations. First, it is not evident that real earnings
are equalized across urban locations, suggesting that there is a capital city agglomeration
effect. In all likelihood, this is a combination of productivity and bargaining effects, both
of which are unobservable characteristics in the data (hence, part of the pure premium).
Second, and perhaps more conclusive, there is evidence for a firm location effect (the five
percentage point difference between the raw and pure premiums in most countries). There
is a tendency for larger and/or foreign-owned firms to agglomerate in the capital city. This
is an effect that the NEG approach could explore further; market and supply-side
explanations are equally likely.
The finding that wage inequality within manufacturing is unlikely to be a significant source
of spatial inequality (i.e. relative to the significant rural–urban income differentials
observed) does not imply that wage inequality is irrelevant. There are sources of wage
inequality, and these tend to be interrelated (albeit with country variations). Larger firms
tend to pay higher wages, as do foreign-owned firms (and these are not always one and the
same firms), and such premia tend to favour more skilled and/or educated workers.
Expanding manufacturing employment (spatially), which tends to be associated with larger
firms and foreign investment, is a source of increased earnings. This may reduce spatial
inequality, if workers are drawn out of low wage agriculture into higher wage (rural)
manufacturing, but at the expense of increasing wage inequality (the skilled–unskilled
differential). Wider opportunities for education and acquiring skills enhances the potential
for all workers to benefit from manufacturing employment, and is more likely to attract
investment in manufacturing. Manufacturing employment may be part of the solution to,
rather than part of the problem of, spatial inequality.15




Log of monthly earnings in
current domestic prices
Mean of formal years of
worker education
Cameroon 0 11.06 9.83
1 11.37 10.26
Ghana 0 9.40 9.79
1 10.16 11.20
Kenya 0 7.69 8.62
1 8.11 8.93
Zambia 0 10.51 10.10
1 10.52 10.31
Zimbabwe 0 6.43 8.35
1 6.61 8.79
Source: Authors’ summary of the data.16
Appendix Table A2: Cross tabulations by ownership, location and firm size
numbers
Location (1 = capital city, 0 otherwise)
F/
size
ALL Cameroon Ghana Kenya Zambia Zimbabwe
01 0 101010101
F=0
1 380 411 62 113 99 64 108 136 60 64 51 34
2 313 403 55 103 92 102 53 90 64 57 49 51
3 183 345 7 38 16 51 35 105 51 30 74 121
4 117 65 89 13 1 0 4 12 5 6 18 34
All 993 1224 213 267 208 217 200 343 180 157 192 240
F=1
1 2 3 2 8 1 1 1 0 39350163
2 4 89 1 1 5 4 662 6 1 4 1 27 7 6 0
3 76 234 15 86 6 34 7 51 18 13 30 50
4 5 15 6 2 8 2 03 0 5 3 3 21 2 3 1
All 198 409 69 162 18 69 29 71 28 23 54 84
Total 1191 1633 282 429 226 286 229 414 208 180 246 324
percentage















01010 1 01 0 101
42 58 40 60 44 56 36 64 54 46 43 57
F=0
1 1 31 591 6 1 9 1 3 1 72 1 1 5 1 69 6
2 11 14 8 14 18 20 8 14 16 15 9 9
3 6 12 1 5 3 10 5 16 13 8 13 21
4 4 21 320 01 21 236
A l l 3 54 33 03 84 1 4 2 3 15 3 4 6 4 03 44 2
F=1
1 11211 2 01 0 011
2 23261 5 22 2 210
3 3821 2 1 7 1 85 359
4 22431 0 10 1 125
All 7 14 10 23 4 13 5 11 7 6 9 15
Total 1191 1633 282 429 226 286 229 414 208 180 246 324
Notes: F=1 indicates owned by a foreigner (individual or firm), otherwise locally owned. The size categories
are 0-10 employees (1), 11-50 employees (2), 51-500 employees (3) and more than 500 employees (4).
Source: Authors’ computations.17
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